downward direction), confidently reporting that the to occur at different times, the discrepancy has generally events appear to occur simultaneously ( Figure 1A ). As been ascribed to time differences in neural transmission in the case of other simultaneity illusions, this subjective or cortical processing that lead to asynchronous awaredelay of motion change has been interpreted as indicatness of the events.
transitions in the motion sequence in place of turning points (second-order temporal changes). The introduction of color-motion asynchrony at high alternation rates results from a change in correspondence matching brought about by temporal limitations on encoding higher-order temporal change and linking tokens of different types.
An analogy may help clarify the distinction we would like to draw between the brain-time explanation of asynchrony we wish to challenge and the temporal correspondence explanation we wish to develop. In the brain-time theory, we can think of the specialized modules of the brain as singers in an Internet chorus. In Britain, a Japanese singer will appear to be delayed due to a transmission time lag. The brain-time theory proposes that there is no compensation for these delays, critically on the rate of stimulus change ( Figure 2 ). We found that robust perceptual asynchrony occurred for stimulus changes at a rate of once every 250 ms, which representation of an external event will depend upon many factors and should prove to be an unreliable estiwas close to the values used in the original report [6] . When the alternation rate was slowed down, however, mate of the real time of events. The event-time from "brain-time" theory is fraught with difficulties [9] [10] [11] [12] . the apparent asynchrony was gradually reduced and almost disappeared at a rate of once every 2000 ms. The interpretation of color-motion asynchrony in terms of processing delay is not compatible with a numSubjects could accurately judge the temporal order of a color change and a direction change for nonrepetitive ber of our experimental findings described below. We propose an alternative account of color-motion asynchsingle changes. The observation that the asynchrony effect is rate dependent not only accounts for why we rony ( Figure 1C) . Our results suggest that there is not a substantial difference in the time it takes for the brain are not normally aware of color-motion asynchrony but also raises questions about the idea that the illusion to establish representations of color change and motion direction change. The visual system, however, cannot reflects a processing time difference between color and motion, which, at least in its simplest version, would directly compare these physical time courses; instead, it has separate mechanisms for temporal judgments. In predict apparent motion delay regardless of the rate of alternation. David Marr's [16] theory of low-level image description, the primal sketch, spatially localized tokens representHowever, we are assuming that processing time delays are fixed. One might argue that the observed effects ing elements of a spatial pattern are used as the input to grouping processes (now often called mid-level visual of alternation rate can be explained if the hypothetical differential processing delays of the two attributes are processes), which combine tokens of the same type to form coherent regions in what Marr called the full primal only seen at high alternation rates. Subjects, however, could accurately judge the order of occurrence between sketch. Here, we extend this idea to temporal processing and use the term temporal marker to refer to temporally a single change and a change embedded in a rapid sequence of alternations, whether the judgment was localized representations of salient temporal features. We propose that color-motion asynchrony results from within or between attributes (asymmetric temporal order judgment: Figure 3 ). This result does not support a differthe action of mid-level temporal grouping processes. To be specific, our hypothesis ascribes this simultaneity ential rate dependency of processing time. Crucially, it shows that the apparent delay at high alternation rates illusion to biased cross-attribute linkage of time markers of the same temporal type: transitions (first-order temis not due to the alternation rate per se. This effectively voids any simple explanation for color-motion asynporal changes) in the color-change sequence map to chrony based in the temporal tuning characteristics of accompanied by a corresponding difference in reaction time. In this experiment, subjects were asked to press low-level visual mechanisms. The apparent delay occurs as a consequence of the requirement to make a compara button as soon as a target (motion direction or color) appeared in a pseudorandom stimulus sequence in ison across two different sequences at high alternation rates. Note also that, for alternations significantly faster which stimuli were selected from one of three distracters ( Figure 4A ). Button-press latencies were found to be than once every 250 ms, the judgment of the motioncolor temporal relationship is almost impossible, even almost identical for motion and color under the stimulus conditions we used (cf. [18] [19] [20] [21] ). To measure subjective when the alternations themselves are clearly visible. A similar failure of attribute association was reported for time differences in a situation in which we know the processing time of attribute change (as measured by luminance-orientation or color-orientation binding when the two attributes changed in separate objects [17] , but reaction time) is, to a first approximation, identical, we presented the same motion direction target sequence the temporal limits on color-direction binding are fairly low even when the changes are instantiated in the same together with a pseudorandom color test sequence in which colors were selected from one of four alternatives objects. These observations indicate that, except in a few cases in which two attributes are presumably coded ( Figure 4B ). Subjects had to report the color displayed in the test sequence when the target direction was prein combination explicitly by early stages [17] 
Task Dependency
The asymmetric temporal order judgement task ( Figure  3) shows that rapid direction changes do not always appear to be delayed. Here, we introduce a performance measure of the perceived time of stimulus alternation that provides confirmatory evidence of this. In these experiments, we used synchronous motor tasks that reflect the subjective temporal relationship between visual stimuli and motor responses. In one experiment, subjects were asked to press a button and hold it down during the downward phase of a repetitive 2 Hz direction alternation. It was found that subjects' button responses for motion change lagged the true point of simultaneity by around 100 ms ( Figure 5 ). Subjects' button presses were approximately synchronous for color changes regardless of the alternation rate. Also, some subjects' button presses synchronized with the direction changes at slow alternation rates. All of this is consistent with the data from the perceptual judgment tasks. These results appear to suggest that temporal relationships were judged veridically for button presses, color changes, and direction changes at the low alternation rate, although rapid direction changes appeared delayed relative to these events. However, although this response delay to motion change appeared to reflect the perceptual delay as described above, it vanished when we switched to a slightly different task. In the second experiment, we found that subjects could accurately synchronize the mately 100-ms motion direction change delay.
The difference in the results between the two synwhich there was no difference in response latency to chrony tasks may appear counterintuitive, but it seems targets, subjective simultaneity required a very substanto agree with the phenomenology of the tasks. For rapid tial motion sequence advance relative to the color sedirection changes, although alternation of two directions quence, even though both tasks required identification is seen, there is no subjective transient signal that clearly of the same target stimulus appearing in the same stimuindicates the time of the direction change. We suspect lus sequence ( Figure 4C ). this is why the subjects could make a forward mouse If we accept that the subjective judgement of percepmovement in synchrony with the phase of upward motual asynchrony measured here, which can be as large tion but could not press a button in time with the beginas 100 ms, reflects neural-processing time differences, ning of a direction change. We think that subjects cannot then it is difficult to understand why it is not reflected reliably encode the time of direction changes due to a in reaction time. The possibility that delayed motion lack of salient features that mark the change events, perception is completely compensated for by fast postand this failure in turn leads to perceptual asynchrony. perception processing is not only anatomically unlikely, but it is also incompatible with the finding that response latencies were nearly identical for single changes of
Transitions versus Turning Points
We have ascribed errors in judging the temporal relationcolor and motion. This is because, when perceptual asynchrony does not occur, such compensation should ship of color and direction changes to the temporal structure of these changes and the need to compare make response latencies much shorter for motion than for color.
two alternating sequences, rather than processing time If our hypothesis is correct, it is to be expected that and compared, accurate temporal judgments of color and motion change can be made. We assume that the perceptual asynchrony will depend on the temporal structure of stimulus sequences (transitions versus turnvisual system can use both transitions and turning points, but it tends to make a match between transitions, ing points) rather than their attribute type (color versus motion). To test this, we measured the point of percepinstead of between transitions and turning points, at tual synchrony for all combinations of transitions and turning points of color and position using a cross-attribute matching task ( Figure 6A ). The transition of color is expected, since, in both cases, the tasks could be accomplished by matching features of the same type. (C1) was an abrupt change between two colors, and the turning point (C2) was the reversal of a gradual change Apparent motion delay is expected for the combination of color transitions and position turning points (C1P2) between the two colors. The transition of position (P1) was an abrupt change between the two positions, which as before. The critical prediction is that an apparent color-change delay should occur for the combination could be judged only by the jump direction, and the turning point (P2) was a motion direction reversal. As in of color turning points and position transitions (C2P1). These predictions were indeed supported by the experithe original demonstration of perceptual asynchrony of color and motion [6] , we systematically varied the relament ( Figures 6B and 6C ). This indicates that the key factor in perceptual asynchrony is the temporal propertive phase of the color and position changes, then asked the subjects to judge their temporal relationships. For ties of the stimuli, not the specialist neural system activated. Note that this result is an empirical justification instance, for the C2P1 stimuli, subjects judged whether the color was changing from red to gray or from gray of our characterization of motion reversal as a secondorder change in position in this context rather than a to red when the position was top or bottom. According to our hypothesis, for the combination of transitions first-order change in motion direction. Closely examining Figure 6C , however, one can notice (C1P1) or turning points (C2P2), no perceptual delay are almost synchronous with motion direction changes. The point of subjective simultaneity is thus strongly biased toward alignment of the same type of stimulus change regardless of the type of stimulus attribute.
By applying the same rule for cross-modality judgments, one can account for the results for synchronized behavioral responses (Figure 4) . For the synchronous button press, the subjects were asked to synchronize transitions of finger/button position with turning points of visual stimulus position. For the mouse movement, on the other hand, they were asked to synchronize transitions of hand/mouse position with transitions of visual stimulus position. Thus, subjects' tendency to link changes of the same temporal type for both body and visual stimuli leads to asynchronous responses in the former case but synchronous responses in the latter case. Figures 6 and 7) . One cannot ascribe this apparent rather than a temporal asynchrony of visual awareness or temporal distortion of immediate visual experience. We recognize that relative information about segregated that perceptual synchrony for C1P1 and C2P2 occurred at a point for which position (motion) changed slightly objects/events is not directly computed in parallel but requires the establishment of a perceptual strategy or earlier than color. Bias in the same direction was found for C1P2 and C2P1. Although we cannot reject the possiperceptual routine to extract the information. To make a relative judgment, an event must be marked and identibility that this residual effect might reflect processing delays, attentional gating [22] could also account for fied as a reference for subsequent comparison with other events. The asynchrony effect arises because, at the observed bias if the subjects always judged the timing of (less salient) color change using the timing of rapid alternation rates, it is difficult to mark and link turning points to transitions, but it is still possible to (more salient) position change as the reference. In fact, the bias was slightly reduced when the strategy to use match the transitions in the two temporal sequences. In fact, the maximum delay was about a quarter cycle the color changes as a reference was facilitated by changing color and position in separate objects (open of the alternation (125 ms), as would be expected from this theory. Even turning points in rapid alternation can symbols).
Discussion

Color-motion asynchrony does not indicate that the processing time for motion is longer than for color. Turning points (second-order temporal changes including motion direction change) generally appear delayed relative to transitions (first-order temporal changes including color changes) when they are compared in rapid alternation (
The importance of temporal structure was further supbe accurately located when subjects pay attention to a single change in the sequence (Figure 3 ). Attending to ported by the results of experiments using luminance change. The results (Figure 7) suggest that abrupt transia turning point might enhance its signal strength, influence feature selection, and/or allow subjects to infer tions of luminance level appear to be almost synchronous with abrupt color transitions, while they appear to the location of a missing turning point from adjacent transitions. In any case, problems in marking turning be largely ahead of motion direction changes. In contrast, luminance turning points (the point of change bepoints at high alternation rates reflect, in part, constraints on the dynamic allocation of attention. At altertween linear luminance increments and decrements) appear to largely lag behind abrupt color transitions but nation rates higher than a few hertz, temporal judgments neural-processing time theory in that we propose that the target neural activity used for temporal coding is time locked to events and dissociated from the encoding of the content of events. It does not need to be located at the cortical area that plays a major role in the analysis of the event content, nor need it reflect the time of establishment of the event representation. These specialist mechanisms for temporal analysis are expected to draw on neural events early in the processing hierarchy so as to mirror, as far as possible, the temporal order of external events (cf. [14] ). Our hypothesis thus moving from left to right), while other neural systems encode the detailed appearance (e.g., color, texture) of the object [32, 33]. Although the experimental evidence become impossible even when the stimulus changes thus far does not clearly point to a mechanism for encodare still detectable (temporal crowding). This can be ing the temporal relations, it is possible that spatiotemascribed to a difficulty in marking salient transitions or poral comparators analogous to local motion detectors a failure in using them properly for temporal binding.
[34-36] or global synchrony detectors [37] could encode Our argument that asynchrony is based on temporal this information. We speculate that the cross-attribute grouping can be neatly demonstrated using a spatial linkage between transitions could be implemented by a version of transition/turning point correspondence. The simple mechanism that computes cross-correlation of alignment of color transition edges (border between red early neural responses, while the linkage between transiand green) with luminance turning points (peaks and tions and turning points may result from an attentiontroughs of a triangular wave) is not difficult when the demanding feature matching mechanism. It is intriguing alternation cycle is low (Figure 8A ), but the appropriate that cross-attribute temporal binding is similar to crossalignment is not unambiguously determined for high attribute apparent motion in various respects, such as spatial alternations ( Figure 8B ) [29] . Which parts of the low temporal resolution, sensitivity to stimulus saliency, display appear aligned depends on how features are and strong influence of attention [38-42]. identified and matched, rather than how the spatial map We believe that manual reaction time primarily reflects of brightness and chromatic change is aligned. For Fig- the objective time at which a decision by the perceptual ure 8B, there seems to be a more natural alignment system becomes available to the motor system; it is between the color pattern and the lower luminance patunlikely to be totally unrelated to the time taken to protern. In this case, color transitions are linked to lumicess task-relevant visual information. Our hypothesis nance transitions rather than to luminance turning accounts for why the response latency can be largely points. We believe that a similar principle governs temdissociated from the subjective judgment of simultaneporal judgment, although matching between transitions ity. Besides the present study, dissociations between prevails in temporal cases due to difficulty in detecting these chronometric measures have been reported for temporal turning points. the present case, some previous studies [10, 44] show argues against our proposal that perceptual asynchrony that temporal judgments tend to be more accurate than cannot be ascribed to neural delay; however, this asympredicted from differences in response latency. This patmetry could be attributed to a temporal response profile tern of results is generally expected from our theory, difference between the two attributes [11] . An intriguing since judgments based on time markers should be less reversal of subjective temporal order of the cutaneous affected by processing delays. Note, however, that substimuli delivered to each hand due to arm crossing [31] jective asynchrony occurs without a difference in stimudemonstrates a different type of temporal misjudgment lus temporal structure (e.g., [5, 43] ), and, in many cases, (mislabeling) that also cannot be ascribed to neural dethe two temporal measures show positive correlations. lay. Our position is close to the multiple drafts model of Agreements are particularly high for luminance [3] and subjective timing [9] and the postdiction theory of visual wavelength [18, 45] manipulations. We believe that this awareness [12, 15] in that the subjective time course of dependency reflects the temporal properties of periphevents is regarded as a result of the brain's interpretative eral neural responses that can affect both the temporal processes.
codes for subjective judgments and the total processing What is the neural basis of the process of temporal time of the system. Revealing the relationship between judgment mediated by time markers? We conjecture subjective temporal judgments and various response that the brain encodes temporal relationships of events latencies will lead to greater insight into the neural basis based on the temporal pattern of the neural activity elicited by those events. This view is distinct from the of temporal judgments. (Figure 2A) , a stationary plaid preand downward. The direction change interval was 250 ms. The subsented on one side alternated in color between green and red, and ject was asked to synchronously press a button while the stimulus a moving plaid presented on the opposite side alternated in its was downward, or to move a hand-held computer mouse forward direction between upward and downward. (An auxiliary experiment and backward in synchrony with the stimulus movements. Since indicated that changing color and direction within the same patterns the subjects had to look at the stimulus in the monitor at all times, did not alter the results.) The relative temporal phase was varied they could not see the movement of their hand, but they could hear from trial to trial. The subject was asked to make a yes-no judgment the click upon the press of the button. During a trial, the state of about whether the two oscillations were perfectly in phase. "In button or speed of the mouse movement was recorded. Each trial phase" was defined as "when the color is red, the direction is downlasted for 15 s, but the first 5 s was discarded in the analysis. ward." The stimulus was presented until the subject made a judgFor the button press response, the button press probability was ment. A total of 30 judgments were made for each phase (n ϭ 30). computed for each trial, then averaged over trials. For the mouse The interchange interval (the alternation rate) was 250 ms (2 Hz), movement response, the speed of the mouse movement was nor-500 ms ( For each block, color and position were changed in a pair of plaids (consisting of 0.7 c/Њ gratings) with a given combination of type of (this duration was randomly varied), the first plaid changed color to red, and the second plaid changed direction to downward. They changes ( Figure 6 ). We varied the relative temporal phase of color and motion changes from trial to trial. Subjects made a two-alternadisappeared 1 s after the change in color. The relative timing of the color and direction changes was varied from trial to trial. The subject tive forced choice on the relative phase. The interchange interval was 250 ms. For the C1P1 stimuli, subjects judged whether the was asked to judge which change occurred first. n ϭ 30. color was gray or red when the position was top or bottom (which could be judged only by the direction of a quarter-cycle jump of the Asymmetric Temporal Order Judgment between Single and Repetitive Changes plaid). For the C1P2 stimuli, subjects judged whether the color was gray or red when the motion direction was upward or downward In each trial of the experiment (Figure 3) , a repetitive alternation of color or motion direction was presented on one side, and a single (8 Њ/s). For the C2P1 stimuli, subjects judged whether the color was changing from red to gray or from gray to red when the position change of color or motion direction was presented on the opposite side. The repetitive stimulus was presented for five and half oscillawas top or bottom. For the C2P2 stimuli, subjects judged whether the color was changing from red to gray or from gray to red when tions, with an interchange interval of 250 ms, starting and ending
